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Abstract
In this paper we explore the effects of the subprime mortgage boom from 2001 to 2005
and the subprime mortgage bust from 2005 to 2008 on the probability of homeownership of
naturalized immigrant, non-naturalized immigrant and native US citizen households. Consistent
with our predictions, we find that from 2001 to 2005 naturalized and non-naturalized immigrant
households increased their probability of homeownership relative to natives by 3.8% and 5.3%,
respectively. Then from 2005 to 2008 naturalized and non-naturalized immigrant households
decreased their probability of homeownership relative to natives by 1.3% and 1.5%, respectively.
Additionally, we find that continent of birth and whether the head of household is self-employed
are important predictors of homeownership for immigrants.
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1 Introduction
Homeownership is one of the primary ways that American families build wealth [Chomsisengphet
and Pennington-Cross, 2006]. It is also a central component of achieving the ‘American Dream’
for immigrants living in the United States. It provides families with stability and a connection
to their neighbors and local community. US homeownership rates grew to historically high levels
during the 1990s, due to a combination of factors including a good economic climate, government
initiatives, and new loan underwriting practices [Quercia et al., 2003]. However, during this time
the “homeownership gap,” the difference between the homeownership rates of native US citizens
and immigrants, widened significantly [Borjas, 2002].
The late-1990s and early-2000s also saw the rise of subprime lending practices, which allow
households that otherwise would not qualify for a prime home mortgage to be able to own a home
[Foote et al., 2008]. In fact, most subprime lending has been concentrated in minority and low-
income areas [Calem et al., 2004]. The subprime lending market peaked in 2005, and has been in
decline since then as a nationwide drop in housing prices has lead to a wave of foreclosures that hit
subprime borrowers especially hard [Mayer and Pence, 2008].
In this paper we set out to differentiate effects of the subprime boom of the early-2000s and
subsequent bust of the late-2000s on native US citizens, naturalized immigrants and non-naturalized
immigrants. As subprime loans do not have as strict downpayment and income documentation
requirements as prime loans, we expect, in line with the previous literature, that the subprime
boom and bust will impact non-naturalized immigrants the most. Our analysis shows that during
the subprime boom time of 2001 to 2005, naturalized immigrants and non-naturalized immigrants
increased their probability of homeownership relative to natives by 3.8% and 5.3%, respectively.
Then during the bust period of 2005 to 2008, both naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants
decreased their probability of homeownership relative to natives by 1.3% and 1.5%, respectively.
We also found that the probability of homeownership of immigrants is significantly affected by their
continent of birth and whether they are self-employed or wage workers.
The rest of this paper is presented as follows: Section 2 provides a review of previous literature,
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Section 3 describes the data used, Section 4 explains our methodology and hypotheses, Section 5
explains our empirical analysis and results, Section 6 has our conclusions and Section 7 presents
our references.
2 Literature Review
The literature review is divided into 3 topics: immigrant assimilation theory and evidence, home-
ownership theory and subprime lending in the US.
2.1 Assimilation Theory and Evidence
Assimilation theory describes the theoretical pathways through which immigrants might assimilate
into their new country. Homeownership can be used as a proxy for the assimilation status of an
immigrant into society [Haan, 2007]. Three theoretical assimilation pathways have been proposed by
Haan [2007]. The first, straight-line assimilation, implies a gradual rise in immigrant homeownership
rates to the level of native cohorts over time. The second, assimilation into a marginal underclass,
implies depressed homeownership rates relative to natives in the long run. The third, staying in an
‘ethnic enclave,’ implies that the homeownership rate of immigrants will vary by community and
not depend on the amount of time spent in the new country. It has also been found that location
choices and the national origin mix of immigrants influence their assimilation pathway, and thus
their homeownership rates [Borjas, 2002].
Using the Myers and Lee [1996] ‘double cohort’ method of tracking immigrant cohorts by their
calendar year of arrival and age at arrival, Borjas [2002] provides evidence that straight-line assim-
ilation effects do exist, that is, homeownership rates for each cohort increase as their time spent
in the US increases. In line with Haan’s second pathway, Borjas offers evidence that the national
origin of immigrants affects their homeownership rate. Since certain immigrant groups have differ-
ent skill levels, one would expect them to attain different levels of homeownership. Borjas [2002]
confirms that this is true as, for example, even after controlling for years in the country, in 1990
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the homeownership rate of Canadian immigrants was more than fifty percentage points higher than
that of Dominican immigrants. Lastly, Borjas finds that the location choices of immigrants affect
their homeownership rates, in accordance with Haan’s ‘ethnic enclave’ theory. Borjas found that
one reason why recent immigrants tend to have lower homeownership rates is that they tend to live
in large cities that have low overall homeownership levels, such as New York and Los Angeles.
It is important to mention that while all three assimilation pathways appear to exist in the
United States, the same is not necessarily true for other countries. For example, in Germany there
is evidence that straight-line assimilation does not occur and that the region of origin of an im-
migrant does not significantly affect their homeownership rate [Sinning, 2006]. The only apparent
assimilation pathway in Germany is assimilation into a marginal underclass, as immigrant house-
holds in Germany are less likely to own their primary residence than comparable native households
[Sinning, 2006].
It is also important to note that Haan [2007], Borjas [2002] and Sinning [2006] do not distinguish
between naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants. In their analyses, naturalized immigrants,
legal permanent residents, and temporary visa holders are all considered to be the same. A study
by McConnell and Marcelli [2007] looks at the effect of the legal status of Mexican immigrants in
Los Angeles on assimilation, symbolized by homeownership. They find no significant difference in
homeownership rates among naturalized immigrants, legal permanent residents, nonimmigrant visa
holders and unauthorized immigrants and speculate that this is due to the rise of subprime lending
and more flexible loan underwriting rules.
2.2 Homeownership Theory
In the previous section we have described the pathways by which immigrants may assimilate into
society on aggregate. In this section we describe the specific factors that determine homeownership
at an individual level. These factors can be separated into three categories: economic, life-cycle and
social capital factors.
The economic characteristics of a family and of the area in which they live affect whether they
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can afford to own a home. More specifically, the probability of homeownership can be thought of as
a function of household income and wealth, the relative cost of owning versus renting in a given area
and the income and downpayment constraints imposed by mortgage lenders [Quercia et al., 2003].
Of these, the downpayment constraint has the largest negative effect on homeownership, implying
that household wealth is a better indicator of homeownership than household income [Quercia et al.,
2003].
Alternatively, the life-cycle theory of homeownership states that the probability of owning a home
is a function of family characteristics that change over time. Life events, such as getting married,
having children and retiring, influence the decision of owning a home [McConnell and Marcelli,
2007]. An ‘ideal’ housing career can be broken down into five phases: pre-child, childbearing, child-
rearing and launching, post-child, and retired life [Haan, 2005]. In general, as families move from
the first through fourth phase their probability of owning a home increases, and as they enter the
last phase it decreases [Haan, 2005].
The social capital theory of homeownership proposes that strong social networks in an area
increase the flow of information about housing opportunities and lower barriers to homeownership.
This process is especially important for immigrants. In fact, English proficiency, time in the country
and civic involvement all have a significant impact on the homeownership rates of immigrants
[McConnell and Marcelli, 2007].
So, in order to accurately predict whether a household will own their home, economic, life-cycle
and social capital characteristics must be taken into account.
2.3 Subprime Lending in the US
Subprime lending began in the late 1980s and grew rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s. Three separate
acts of Congress created the legal conditions necessary for the growth of subprime lending. The
first, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980,
allowed lenders to charge high rates and fees to borrowers. The second, the Alternative Mortgage
Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA) of 1982, permitted the use of variable interest rates. Third,
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the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, prohibited tax deductions on consumer loans but allowed tax
deductions on mortgages on a primary residence [Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006].
The first two acts allowed for the creation of subprime mortgage loans while the third provided an
incentive for their proliferation. Subprime mortgages were part of a wave of financial innovation
that were supposed to make homeownership more accessible by allowing buyers with lower credit
scores, smaller down payments or little documentation of income to get mortgages [Mayer and
Pence, 2008].
Subprime lending can be divided into two distinct time periods. From 1995-1999 subprime
lending exhibited rapid growth, mostly in the riskiest segments of the mortgage market. From 2000-
2004, volume grew rapidly in the least risky segment, with much of it securitized because mortgage-
backed securities (with subprime loans as collateral) became attractive to investors [Chomsisengphet
and Pennington-Cross, 2006].
As there is no precise definition for what constitutes a subprime loan, three proxies are used
to count subprime loans, depending on the data available. Subprime loans are defined as those
in securitized pools marked as subprime, those with high interest rates, or those that originate
with lenders that specialize in subprime lending [Mayer and Pence, 2008]. Subprime loans are
characterized by higher interest rates and fees to compensate for the poor credit history of the
borrower and low downpayments. Even borrowers with a high credit score may have trouble getting
a prime loan because of high loan-to-value or debt-to-income ratios or lack of documentation of
income and assets [Foote et al., 2008]. Lack of income documentation is especially a concern for
recent immigrants, unauthorized immigrants and those who are not fluent in English [McConnell
and Marcelli, 2007]. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, in the third
quarter of 2002 delinquency of subprime mortgages was 5.5 times higher than prime mortgages
(14.28% versus 2.54%) and the foreclosure rate of subprime mortgages was 10 times higher than
prime mortgages (2.08% versus 0.2%) [Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006]. Additionally,
mortgages with high loan-to-value ratios (meaning a low downpayment) are most likely to default
[Foote et al., 2008].
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While data on subprime lending is scarce, some trends have been uncovered by Mayer and Pence
[2008]. First, subprime originations have only a partial correlation with housing price appreciation.
While levels of subprime origination are high in Florida and California, which have had high housing
price appreciation, levels are low in the New York and Boston areas, which have also had high
housing price appreciation [Mayer and Pence, 2008]. Second, subprime originations are not only
common in the inner city, which has high densities of low income families, but also in metro outskirts,
due to new construction (a trend that has been especially prevalent in the Atlanta area). While
regression analysis finds that subprime originations and new construction are significantly correlated,
the direction of causation is unknown [Mayer and Pence, 2008]. Third, subprime mortgages are
concentrated in zip codes with high proportions of black and Hispanic families, even after controlling
for income and credit score. Fourth, subprime originations are concentrated in zip codes with more
mid-level credit scores and high unemployment rates, implying that subprime loans do provide
mortgages to those families unable to get a traditional mortgage loan [Mayer and Pence, 2008].
Lastly, subprime originations as a share of total housing units is highest in ’hot’ housing markets, like
Arizona, Nevada, California and Florida, while subprime originations as a share of all originations
is highest in depressed housing markets in the Midwest [Mayer and Pence, 2008].
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
For our analysis we used the American Community Survey (ACS) microdata set from IPUMS-USA,
the Integrated Public Use Microdata series provided by the Minnesota Population Center. The ACS
is a yearly survey of 1% of the US population that contains detailed information on a household’s
income, mortgage payments, citizenship status, birthplace and other demographic characteristics.
To eliminate biased results we only use data for individuals denoted as the head of household. We
use data from the years 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2008. The year 2001 corresponds with the acceleration
of the subprime boom, the year 2005 corresponds with the height of subprime peak, and the years
2007 and 2008 correspond with the subprime bust. Summary statistics for this data are shown in
7
Table 1: Summary Statistics of ACS Data
Variable Obs Mean Max Min
owner 2.83M 0.73 0 1
naturalized 2.69M 0.06 0 1
non-natur 2.66M 0.05 0 1
year 2.83M 2005.6 2001 2008
self-employed 2.18M 0.13 0 1
employed 2.83M 0.64 0 1
ln(income) 2.74M 10.1 -0.3 13.6
English 2.83M 0.99 0 1
married 2.83M 0.55 0 1
divorced 2.83M 0.18 0 1
widowed 2.83M 0.11 0 1
age 2.83M 51.9 15 95
education 2.83M 11.5 1 18
num children 2.83M 0.70 0 9
Table 1.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the ACS data set are shown in Table 2. Naturalized immigrants have the
highest average family income and highest average home value while non-naturalized immigrants
have the lowest average income and US citizens have the lowest average home value. We expect that
non-naturalized immigrants have higher home values than US citizens despite their lower income
because they tend to live in cities (especially New York and Los Angeles) where homes are generally
more expensive than suburban and rural areas [Borjas, 2002].
Descriptive statistics for the ACS data set broken down by continent of birth are shown in
Table 3. For all continents, non-naturalized immigrants have lower homeownership rates than
their naturalized counterparts. This difference is expected because people that go through the
naturalization process likely plan on staying in the US for the long term and so are more likely to buy
a home than non-naturalized immigrants who may plan to return to their home country in the near
future. Likewise, for most continents there is a significant difference in the income’s of naturalized
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Table 2: ACS Descriptive Statistics
Overall US Citizen Naturalized Non-naturalized
income mean 54042 54068 61200 44651
median 39188 39540 43445 30753
num 2.8M 2.5M 170K 135K
value of home mean 237524 228260 357313 283054
median 162500 162500 275000 225000
num 2.07M 1.89M 123K 60K
mortgage payment 1 mean 1098 1059 1484 1382
median 901 866 1222 1214
num 1.34M 1.2M 86K 47K
mortgage payment 2 mean 410 397 564 502
median 304 304 405 357
num 350K 320K 22K 10K
and non-naturalized immigrants. This difference likely reflects the different skills and motivations
of each class of immigrants. For Central America, South America, Asia and Africa, naturalized
immigrants have higher incomes than non-naturalized immigrants while for North America, Europe
and Australia, non-naturalized immigrants have higher incomes. For the latter group, the higher
income for non-naturalized immigrants is likely driven by professionals who come to the US for high-
paying jobs but still maintain strong ties with their home countries and thus do not go through the
naturalization process.
Additionally, for most continents there is a significant difference in the mortgage payment/home
value ratio and the mortgage payment/income ratio. The mortgage payment/home value ratio
gives the median yearly mortgage payment divided by the median home value for each group. For
every continent, this ratio is higher for non-naturalized immigrants than naturalized immigrants,
reflecting the fact that non-naturalized immigrants pay a mortgage premium compared to citizens
because lending institutions generally have less information about them. The higher ratio could also
mean that immigrants are more likely to take out subprime mortgages, which are more expensive
than prime mortgages.
In Table 4 we present descriptive statistics broken down between self-employed workers and wage
workers. We made this distinction because we expect that self-employed workers may be better off
than wage workers in general, but are also more exposed to economic downturns because their
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Table 3: ACS Descriptive Statistics by Continent of Birth
income home value mort1 mort2 mort/HV mort/inc num HO rate
US born 39,540 162,500 866 304 8.6% 36% 2,513,112 76%
US terr 69,206 575,000 3,196 1,124 9.0% 75% 93 31%
N Amer nat 42,030 225,000 1,113 306 7.6% 41% 6,017 81%
res 50,410 225,000 1,214 306 8.1% 36% 5,310 69%
C Amer nat 35,625 225,000 1,113 384 8.0% 50% 51,406 68%
res 24,410 162,500 992 374 10.1% 67% 66,791 41%
S Amer nat 43,445 350,000 1,324 374 5.8% 47% 10,138 69%
res 32,760 275,000 1,416 364 7.8% 65% 8,667 41%
Europe nat 39,880 275,000 1,121 364 6.5% 45% 39,264 78%
res 43,445 275,000 1,222 326 6.8% 43% 18,948 57%
Asia nat 57,100 350,000 1,517 448 6.7% 41% 55,244 75%
res 43,445 275,000 1,426 387 7.9% 50% 29,253 41%
Africa nat 48,815 275,000 1,417 404 7.9% 45% 5,285 64%
res 29,545 225,000 1,324 357 9.0% 68% 5,094 31%
Austr nat 55,325 350,000 1,417 405 6.2% 40% 601 80%
res 57,520 350,000 1,517 404 6.6% 40% 939 53%
Table 4: Differences between self employed and wage workers
US Born Naturalized Non-Citizen
self wage self wage self wage
HO rate 85% 73% 83% 73% 57% 49%
income mean 58600 45870 64130 48700 46080 41000
median 33520 35670 35310 36370 26070 27350
num 212K 1.2M 17K 81K 8K 44K
value of home mean 309900 225320 447535 345000 353560 275400
median 225000 162500 350000 275000 275000 225000
mort payment 1 mean 1313 1053 1815 1460 1590 1365
median 1019 880 1518 1315 1325 1215
num 143K 940K 13K 65K 6K 38K
mort payment 2 mean 501 397 700 535 590 485
median 354 303 480 400 410 355
num 41K 320K 4K 17K 2K 8K
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income is not as reliable. The data shows that for all classifications, self-employed workers have a
higher homeownership rate, higher income, and higher home values.
4 Methodology & Hypotheses
Subprime mortgages were created for people who do not qualify for prime mortgage loans. The main
reasons a person may not qualify for a prime loan are 1) poor credit history (or no credit history), 2)
lack of documentation of income or assets, or 3) small downpayment. We expect that immigrants,
and especially non-naturalized immigrants, will face problems 1) & 2) at a higher rate than native
US citizens. Thus, we expect that immigrants are more likely to be engaged in subprime lending
than native US citizens. Furthermore, we expect non-naturalized immigrants are more likely to be
engaged in subprime lending than naturalized immigrants.
The lack of a formal definition of subprime loan makes it hard to track and measure subprime
lending. Thus, it is hard to directly determine who has been engaged in subprime lending. Our
approach is to measure participation in the subprime market indirectly by conducting a before-
and-after analysis of the homeownership gap between native citizens and each class of immigrants
(naturalized and non-naturalized). If the homeownership gap between natives and immigrants
decreases it provides evidence that immigrants are attaining homeownership at a higher rate than
natives, suggesting that immigrants are more active in the subprime mortgage market than natives.
On the other hand, if the gap between natives and immigrants increases it provides evidence that
immigrants are less active in the mortgage market or that they are losing their homes at a faster
rate than natives.
We test our hypotheses using a linear probability model, which is shown in a general form as
equation 1. To estimate this model we employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique.
Ht = β0,t + β1,i,tNi,t + β2,i,t(Ni,t ∗ Y ) + β3,k,tSk + β4,tXt + β5,k,tZk + ε (1)
In equation 1, H is a binary variable for homeownership set to 1 for households that own their home
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and 0 for those that do not. N is a binary variable representing the immigrant and citizenship status
of the household set to 1 for immigrants and 0 for natives, where i = 1 for naturalized immigrants
and i = 2 for non-naturalized immigrants. The variable (Ni,t ∗ Y ) is an interaction effect between
binary variables for immigrant/citizenship status and “after” year (2005 for the boom period and
2008 for the bust period). We use different models for each time period where t = 1 represents the
boom time (2001-2005) and t = 2 represents the bust time (2005-2008).
The S variable is a proxy for the local subprime market, where k = 1 represents the subprime
“hotbed” dummy variable and k = 2 represents the state subprime origination ratio variable. The
subprime “hotbed” proxy is a dummy variable representing households that live in metropolitan
areas in the five “hotbed” states with the highest number of subprime loans (California, Nevada,
Georgia, Florida, Arizona). This variable allows us to separate out those households that were most
strongly influenced by the subprime lending market. The second proxy is the ratio of the number
of subprime mortgages to total mortgages for each state in the year 2005, as calculated by Mayer
and Pence [2008]. While this ratio potentially masks differences in housing markets within states,
it does help to differentiate those states that were highly involved in subprime lending and those
that were not. It should be noted that our subprime proxies try to capture whether or not living
in an area with high levels of subprime lending influences the probability of homeownership of a
household. These proxies do not tell us which individual households take out subprime loans and
cannot tell us how taking out a subprime loan affects the probability of homeownership of that
individual household.
X is a matrix of variables including the head of household’s sex, age, marital status, income,
employment status, English proficiency, education and the number of children in the household,
and Z is a matrix of state dummy variables for k = 1 and is not included in the equation for k = 2.
The coefficients of interest are β1, β2 and β3. A significant value for β1,i,t means that there is a
difference in the probability of homeownership between native citizens and the set of immigrants i
at the start of time period t. We expect this coefficient to be negative, meaning that there exists
a “homeownership gap” (i.e., immigrants have a lower probability of homeownership than natives).
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A significant value for β2,i,t means that there is a change in the “homeownership gap” between
native citizens and the set of immigrants i by the end of period t. We expect this coefficient to be
positive when t = 1 (the boom time) because the availability of subprime loans helped immigrants
who previously were not eligible for a prime loan to be able to afford to own a home. We expect it
to be negative when t = 2 (the bust time) because households with subprime loans were especially
vulnerable to losing their home during the economic downturn and we believe the relative number of
immigrants with subprime loans is higher than the number of natives with subprime loans. We also
expect that the magnitude of the coefficient will be larger for i = 2 (non-naturalized immigrants)
than for i = 1 (naturalized immigrants) because they had more to gain during the boom, because
of documentation problems, and more to lose during the bust, because they may have less resources
to rely on.
While most of our analysis focuses on differences between naturalized and non-naturalized immi-
grants, we also look at differences between immigrants based on birthplace. Immigrants are divided
by continent of birth to examine how birth continent affects homeownership outcomes. We also in-
clude immigrants from US territories in this analysis. Though technically citizens of the US, people
from the US territories are still different from native US citizens and behave like immigrants. The
model we use for this analysis is shown as equation 2.
Prob(Ht = 1) = Φ(α0,t +
∑
l
α1,l,tRl,t + α2,tS + α3,tXt) (2)
In equation 2, Rl,t’s are the set of dummy variables for each continent of birth where R1 ∼ US
Territories, R2 ∼ North America, R3 ∼ Central America, R4 ∼ South America, R5 ∼ Europe, R6 ∼
Asia, R7 ∼ Africa, R8 ∼ Australia. The base group that these immigrant groups are compared to
is native US citizens. Additionally, S is the subprime “hotbed” proxy variable and Xt is a matrix
of variables including the head of household’s employment status, income, marital status, English
proficiency, age, education level and number of children in the household. The model is run four
times, where t = 1 refers to 2001, t = 2 refers to 2005, t = 3 refers to 2007 and t = 4 refers to 2008.
Equation 2 is estimated as a probit regression, with the coefficients representing the marginal
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effects from the probit estimation. These effects represent the marginal impact of an infinitesimal
change in each independent continuous variable on the probability of homeownership, providing
z straight forward interpretation of estimated results from the probit models. For the birthplace
dummy variables, the coefficient estimates can be interpreted as the change in the probability of
homeownership for a particular immigrant group relative to natives.
By executing the model separately for each year, we can track how the coefficients of interest,
the α1,l,t’s, change over time. We expect that the coefficients will be negative for all immigrant
groups for all years, reflecting the “homeownership gap,” and that the magnitude of the coefficients
should decrease during the boom time (2001 to 2005) and increase during the bust time (2005 to
2007/2008), for the reasons explained above. We also expect the magnitude of the coefficients will
vary significantly by continent of birth. Based on previous literature, immigrants from the US
territories and Africa are expected to have the largest homeownership gap.
Lastly, we investigate the differing impact of the subprime mortgage market on wage workers
and self-employed workers. For this analysis we use a linear probability model estimated using OLS,
shown as equation 3.
Ht = γ0,t + γ1,tFt + γ2,tXt + γ3,tZ + ε (3)
In the equation, Ft is a binary variable for self-employment set to 1 for self-employed workers and 0
for wage workers, Xt is a matrix of variables including the head of household’s employment status,
income, marital status, English proficiency, age, education level and number of children in the
household and Z is a matrix of state dummy variables. The model is run four times, where t = 1
refers to 2001, t = 2 refers to 2005, t = 3 refers to 2007 and t = 4 refers to 2008.
By executing the model seperately for each year, we can track how the coefficients of interest, the
γ1,t’s, change over time. We expect that the coefficients will be positive for all years because self-
employed workers are generally better off than wage workers. We also expect that the magnitude of
the coefficient will decrease during the bust time (2005-2007/2008) because self-employed workers
are more vulnerable to economic downturns because they are heavily invested in service industries
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and generally have less reliable sources of income.
5 Empirical Analysis & Results
The results of our before-and-after analysis for 2001 to 2005 is shown in Table 5. Models 1 and 2
look at naturalized immigrants and native citizens while models 3 and 4 look at non-naturalized
immigrants and native citizens. Model 1, which uses the subprime dummy variable as a subprime
proxy, shows that in 2001 naturalized immigrants had a 4% lower probability of homeownership than
natives but that they closed this gap by 2005. The subprime dummy variable also has a negative
effect, with households living in subprime hotbeds having a 3% lower probability of homeownership.
When the state subprime ratio is used as a proxy, in model 2, the results are similar to model 1
and the subprime effect is still negative. Model 3 shows that in 2001 non-naturalized immigrants
had a 24% lower probability of homeownership than native citizens and that they increased their
probability of homeownership relative to natives by 5% from 2001 to 2005. The subprime dummy
variable had a negative effect of the same magnitude as in model 1. When using the state subprime
ratio as a proxy, in model 4, the results are similar to model 3 and the subprime effect is still
negative.
Next we present the results from the before-and-after analysis for 2005 to 2008 in Table 6.
Models 1 and 2 look at naturalized immigrants and native citizens while models 3 and 4 look
at non-naturalized immigrants and native citizens. Model 1 shows that in 2005 the probability of
homeownership for naturalized immigrants was not significantly different than that of native citizens
but by 2008 the probability of homeownership for naturalized immigrants was 1.3% lower than that
of native citizens. The subprime dummy variable again has a negative effect, with households
living in subprime hotbeds having a 3.4% lower probability of homeownership. Model 2, which
uses the state subprime ratio as the subprime proxy gives slightly different results. It shows that
in 2005 naturalized immigrants had a 2.7% lower probability of homeownership than natives and
that this gap did not significantly change from 2005 to 2008. The state subprime ratio coefficient
is significant, as is the state subprime ratio interacted with the year 2008, showing that households
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Table 5: Factors that Influence the Probability of Homeownership from 2001 to 2005
Naturalized Non-Naturalized









state subp ratio -1.185* -1.22*
(0.021) (0.021)
subp dummy -0.031* -0.033*
(0.004) (0.004)
self 0.045* 0.044* 0.048* 0.047*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
employed 0.021* 0.022* 0.021* 0.022*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(income) 0.072* 0.070* 0.072* 0.071*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
English 0.021* 0.156* 0.064* 0.071*
(0.001) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
married 0.285* 0.293* 0.277* 0.285*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
divorced 0.076* 0.081* 0.070* 0.076*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
widowed 0.157* 0.163* 0.147* 0.153*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
num child 0.022* 0.021* 0.024* 0.023*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
education 0.009* 0.008* 0.008* 0.007*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
intercept -0.797 -0.772 -.723* -0.693
(0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
State Dummies Yes No Yes No
* denotes significance at 1%
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Table 6: Factors Influencing the Probability of Homeownership from 2005 to 2008
Naturalized Non-Naturalized









state subp ratio -1.179* -1.22*
(0.019) (0.019)
subp ratio*2008 -0.346* -0.352*
(0.015) (0.015)
subp dummy -0.034* -0.036*
(0.003) (0.003)
self 0.046* 0.045* 0.049* 0.048*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
employed 0.020* 0.022* 0.020* 0.023*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(income) 0.072* 0.071* 0.073* 0.071*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
English 0.123* 0.135* 0.051* 0.059*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004)
married 0.280* 0.287* 0.272* 0.279*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
divorced 0.072* 0.076* 0.066* 0.070*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
widowed 0.153* 0.158* 0.143* 0.148*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
num child 0.019* 0.018* 0.022* 0.021*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
education 0.010* 0.009* 0.009* 0.008*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
intercept -0.790* -0.757* -0.727* -0.687
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
State Dummies Yes No Yes No
* denotes significance at 1%
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living in areas with high levels of subprime lending in 2005 have a significantly lower probability of
homeownership in 2008.
Model 3 shows that in 2005 the probability of homeownership for non-naturalized immigrants was
18.3% lower than natives and that by 2008 the gap between non-naturalized immigrants and natives
increased by 1.5%. Again, the subprime dummy variable has a negative effect, with households
living in subprime hotbeds having a 3.6% lower probability of homeownership. Model 4, which
uses the state subprime ratio as the subprime proxy gives similar results. It shows that non-
naturalized immigrants have a 20.9% lower probability of homeownership in 2005 and this gap did
not significantly change from 2005 to 2008. Additionally, the state subprime ratio coefficient is
significant, as is the state subprime ratio interacted with the year 2008, showing that households
living in areas with high levels of subprime lending in 2005 have a significantly lower probability of
homeownership in 2008.
The other variables act in the direction we would expect. The coefficients for the employed
dummy variable, self-employed dummy variable and for ln(income) are all positive and significant
in all models. The coefficients for the English proficiency dummy variable, age variable, number
of children variable, years of education variable and each of the married, divorced and widowed
dummy variables are all also positive and significant in all models.
In addition to investigating how the homeownership levels of both classes of immigrants change
over time, we also investigated the impact of birthplace and employment status on homeownership
and how it varied during the subprime mortgage boom and bust. Table 6 tracks the impact of
birthplace on homeownership rate over time for each of the years 2001, 2005, 2007, 2008. For every
group the negative effect of birthplace diminishes from 2001 to 2007, meaning that the gap between
immigrants and natives decreased over this time, which is in line with our earlier results. For
immigrants from North America, Central America, Europe and Asia, the effect then rebounds from
2007 to 2008, meaning that the homeownership gap between immigrants from these areas and natives
widened during this time. Meanwhile, for immigrants from South America, Africa and Australia,
the effect continues to diminish from 2007 to 2008, meaning that the homeownership gap between
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Table 7: Changes in Birthplace Coefficients over Time
2001 2005 2007 2008
US Territories -0.239* -0.200* -0.159* -0.159*
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
N Amer -0.081* -0.051* -0.049* -0.056*
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
C Amer -0.172* -0.119* -0.104* -0.106*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
S Amer -0.217* -0.175* -0.159* -0.156*
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Europe -0.114* -0.091* -0.081* -0.088*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Asia -0.207* -0.146* -0.144* -0.151*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Africa -0.358* -0.287* -0.271* -0.262*
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Aust -0.241* -0.181* -0.146* -0.130*
(0.035) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
subp dummy -0.047* -0.059* -0.067* -0.072*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
self 0.076* 0.069* 0.075* 0.073*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
employed 0.015* 0.007* 0.009* 0.011*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln(income) 0.080* 0.079* 0.078* 0.080*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married 0.295* 0.266* 0.266* 0.271*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
divorced 0.046* 0.031* 0.032* 0.029*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
widowed 0.093* 0.082* 0.082* 0.082*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
English 0.168* 0.134* 0.156* 0.123*
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
age 0.010* 0.008* 0.008* 0.009*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
num child 0.031* 0.022* 0.023* 0.022*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
education 0.007* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* denotes significance at 1%
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Table 8: Changes in Self-Employed Coefficient Over Time
2001 2005 2007 2008
self 0.051* 0.047* 0.052* 0.050*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
immigrant -0.127* -0.193* -0.083* -0.188*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
employed 0.022* 0.019* 0.018* 0.025*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(income) 0.072* 0.074* 0.073* 0.072*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
subp dummy -0.013* -0.035* -0.031* -0.038*
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
married 0.289* 0.271* 0.269* 0.272*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
divorced 0.077* 0.068* 0.068* 0.064*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
widowed 0.153* 0.146* 0.145* 0.140*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
age 0.009* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
English 0.156* 0.059* 0.159* 0.042*
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
num child 0.030* 0.022* 0.023* 0.021*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
education 0.006* 0.008* 0.009* 0.009*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
intercept -0.840* -0.716* -0.848* -0.740*
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
* denotes significance at 1%
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immigrants from these areas and natives continued to decrease during this time. Additionally, for
immigrants from the US territories the effect of birthplace on homeownership does not change from
2007 to 2008.
Last we track how the impact of being self-employed changes over time. Self-employed workers
in the US tend to be better off than wage workers; as shown in Table 4 self-employed workers have
higher homeownership rates, incomes and home values than wage workers. As shown in Table 8, the
positive effect of self-employment on homeownership decreases from 2001 to 2005, then increases
again from 2005 to 2007 and then decreases from 2007 to 2008. All these changes are relatively
small showing that self-employed workers were not significantly affected by the subprime boom and
have not yet been affected by the subprime bust.
6 Inferences & Conclusions
Our analysis enables us to make several inferences about the differing effects of the subprime mort-
gage boom and bust on naturalized immigrants, non-naturalized immigrants and native citizens.
First, we can infer that both naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants benefited from the
subprime mortgage boom from 2001 to 2005. Both groups experienced significant gains in home-
ownership over this time relative to native citizens. This is in line with our original hypothesis
that immigrants will benefit most from the subprime mortgage boom because without subprime
loans many immigrants would be unable to afford a home. Additionally, we find evidence that non-
naturalized immigrants experienced a bigger gain in homeownership than naturalized immigrants,
as expected.
Second, we find evidence that the subprime mortgage bust hurt immigrants more than natives.
This evidence is not as strong as that of our previous inference but this is to expected because
the subprime bust only began in late 2007 and accelerated in in mid-2008, while our 2008 data is
from March 2008. We expected that non-naturalized immigrants would be impacted more than
naturalized immigrants, but the evidence suggests that the decrease in relative homeownership was
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not significantly different for naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants. We should note that we
cannot pinpoint the exact cause of the decrease in the relative homeownership rates of immigrants
during the subprime mortgage bust. The decrease is likely attributed to a combination of the
tightening of credit markets, preventing new mortgages, and foreclosures, terminating previously
existing mortgages.
We can also infer that continent of birth is an important predictor of homeownership for immi-
grants in the US. We found that immigrants from Africa have the lowest homeownership rates and
immigrants from North America (namely Canada) have the highest homeownership rates, though
all groups have significantly lower homeownership rates than natives. Additionally, from 2001 to
2005 the negative impact of birthplace decreased for all groups. From 2005 to 2007 the negative
impact of birthplace increased for immigrants from North America, Central America, Europe and
Asia while the negative effect continued to decrease for immigrants from South America, Africa and
Australia. These trends are in line with our other results and provide evidence for our hypotheses.
Overall, our analysis shows that the subprime mortgage boom and bust had a large effect on
the housing market, especially for immigrants. During the boom period, both naturalized and non-
naturalized immigrants experienced significant gains in homeownership relative to natives. Then
during the bust both immigrants groups have experienced significant losses in homeownership rel-
ative to natives. The data on the subprime bust is still very preliminary so the fact that it reveals
significant losses is telling. We expect that these losses will continue to occur in years to come
because of the tightening of credit markets and stricter loan underwriting rules.
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